Sep 12
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ChristianGovernance eletter – September 1, 2012
What should Christians offer in place of the postmodern vision?
I do need to discuss the one area of disagreement I have with it. Mr. Gosselin’s primary focus was postmodernism, what we as Christians might call, “the Problem.” He wasn’t writing to offer “the Solution,” and preach Christianity. There is, in fact, only one small section where I really understood him as laying out the perspective of a Christian solution to this postmodern problem and, in so doing, giving the most explicit expression to his own Christian views. It is here where I have to take issue with Mr. Gosselin’s comments.
I consider the debate over the theory of neutrality to be one of the most important philosophical and practical question of our day. As Mr. Gosselin repeatedly notes, postmodernism pretends that it embodies neutrality and, therefore, that by doing so, it represents reality, and so should be the governing paradigm for life. But the notion of neutrality, of course, is not new. Declarations by such people as the once Prime Minister of Holland Abraham Kuyper that there is no square inch of the world over which Jesus Christ does not say, “This is mine,” have caused a stir among people since at least the beginning of the last century. Branches of Christianity have attempted to make peace with the notion of neutrality in public life for many centuries. We address this point regularly in ChristianGovernance commentaries. We did so in our recent review of Canadian Reformed professor Dr. Cornelis Van Dam’s new book, God and Government. We expect do so again soon in a critique of comments made by Brian Stiller a Global Ambassador for the World Evangelical Alliance. He was addressing the secularist rhetoric during the Quebec election.
Mr. Gosselin, despite his clarity on the matter of neutrality in discussing postmodernism, appears to have a blind spot or two in terms of how to avoid the concept when proposing the Christian solution to public morality and statecraft. I want to interact with some of his comments in this regard as well as material he writes as background to his thoughts on the civil government.
Rites of Passage
“Rites of Passage” is the title of the chapter where the material can be found that I want to challenge, specifically pp. 160-168. As one might expect in a chapter with that title, the material includes discussion about what the religions being discussed say about prosylitism, evangelism and conversion. Mr. Gosselin sees a relationship between views on conversion and beliefs about the legitimate role of the state, hence the way he approaches the subject matter. I don’t dispute this. I also find it refreshing to read people who have a worldview perspective and, therefore, understand the inter-relationship between what one believes about such different topics.
Prior to discussing the postmodern approach to prosyltism/evangelism and conversion and how this thinking relates to the function of the state, Mr. Gosselin discusses Christian thinking on this subject. There are, of course, more than one Christian tradition when it comes to these matters, so he has to make distinctions at this level as well. I don’t typically dig into theological distinctions at this level in ChristianGovernance eletters, but the author has raised these distinctions, and linked them to his thinking on civil government and public ethics, so we need to interact with them a bit.
Mr. Gosselin distinguishes conversion understood as a wholly free choice made by the individual from a coercive approach to conversion. He also raises the matter of baptism, and associates baptism on the basis of profession of faith with free choice conversion. He holds up free conversion and what is sometimes called “believers’ baptism” as the correct position. He writes: “In the case of Christianity and the Protestant tradition, particularly among Evangelicals, conversion is viewed as legitimate only when it is freely chosen, unrestricted and linked to a conscious personal, reasoned decision. The baptism of infants (before the age of reason) is thus rejected.”
He contrasts this position with the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Anglican and Lutheran traditions, some of which he argues are associated with legacies of forced conversion through illegitimate allegiances between church and state, and traditions which use of baptism as a social and territorial marker rather than a sign of conversion. Some of what he presents as historical facts as well as interpretation are new to me and no doubt leave much room for debate. He writes at one point: “Among Catholics (as well as Lutherans and Anglicans), the practice of baptizing children before the age of reason eventually became an indispensable element in the system. As a recruitment practice, the effectiveness of such an approach makes it rather irresistible.”
What happened to Reformed Christianity?
One aspect of this presentation that I find very odd is that he does not make reference in the same manner to the incredibly significant Reformed tradition which includes the likes of John Calvin, the Hugenots in France, Abraham Kuyper, who became the Prime Minister of Holland, John Knox and the Presbyterian tradition which captured Britain for a time and pioneered the emigration to America and later the American War of Independence. He does reference their impact positively here and in a couple of other spots, so he is not unaware of “Calvinism” and the Reformed tradition, so I don’t understand why he makes no distinction between his view and them. Perhaps it’s because they can’t be pigeon-holed as easily. After all, they hold to infant baptism as do the other traditions he questions, though they attribute very different meaning to it. Reformed Christians also believe in the sovereign election of God in salvation rather than the notion of unrestricted free choice. This does not involve coercion, but many Christians from other traditions feel that it does. As a Reformed Christian, I see myself among those Christian traditions that Mr. Gosselin rejects as offering the necessary alternative to non-Christian – specifically postmodern – thinking. In the subject matter I prefer to address, we will see that he rejects the best of Reformed teaching about Christian civil government.
On the other hand, he clearly approves of some implications of the Reformed tradition in history. For example, he writes: “Patterns of government in Reformed Churches, managed by elders, helped establish democratic attitudes and habits in the West.” Elsewhere (p. 189) he writes: “In the West, two opposing principles have shaped political power over the centuries. For a long time monarchical government was legitimized by the divine right of kings. Because of the divine sanction involved, this principle, admitted no limit to royal power. … In nations under Reformation influence, the divine right principle gradually fell into disfavour as the principle of Lex Rex became dominant. This principle states that since Law is first of all established by God, it stands above all, even above the highest human authorities. Its authority is supreme and, therefore, no temporal power can be considered absolute. Consequently, it is considered as a fundamental principle that no one should be viewed as above the law, not even the king. In this context, common people could therefore refer to the rule of law if a king abused his powers.” Lex Rex was written by the staunch Presbyterian theologian, Samuel Rutherford.
Religion and the state – No such thing as neutrality
I want to address the problematic points which come up in Mr. Gosselin’s discussion of religion and politics, following his comments on conversion and baptism, but first I want to note two places where he seems to accept the notion of neutrality in this prior discussion. In his brief survey of history around the matters of conversion and baptism, he writes that “the writers of the epistles recommended that Christians be submitted to civil authority, at a time when none of these authorities were Christian and who, in some cases actively persecuted Christians (Titus 3:1; 1 Peter 2:13). The result of this recommendation was to ensure the independence of the state.”
Independence implies neutrality. Independent from what? Most people I have read who offer similar arguments say independence from religion. Mr. Gosselin does not expound on this point, so I don’t know if that’s what he means. If so, it’s not true. Submission to authorities does not imply a state independent of religion, or independent of Christian religion. Scripture is clear that Christ rules and demands that His Lordship be recognized over every area of life (cf. Matthew 28, Colossians, Revelation).
About infant baptism, he writes: “Although this model may be defended by stating that ‘the individual always has the choice to stay or leave,’ the fact remains that before the individual has any chance to understand the implications of what Christianity entails, he is already identified, by those around him, as a Catholic, Anglican or Lutheran Christian. In practical terms, individual choice has been done away with.”
Children are also born a certain colour with no choice in the matter. They are also born to parents in particular financial circumstances that are different from the family who lives on the other side of town. They are born to parents with different political beliefs. They are born to particular parents who are very different in multiple ways from any other parents. So what? It’s not typically Christians who object to this. It’s been atheists, humanists, who argue that children should all be raised in common, who object to Christian schools and home schooling that enable parents to “indoctrinate” their children in their own beliefs. The radical atheist ideology of abstract LIBERTY, which argues that all men should be able to start life as a blank slate is very different from the Biblical notion of FREEDOM which predicates a context in the real world, and a cultural framework that builds on the legacy of the past.
Why should baptism be an exception to the rule? In fact, it should probably be less of an exception than other aspects of child influence. It looks back on the Old Testament sign of circumcision, which God commanded to be performed on the 8th day. This was a physical, non-removable sign that God commanded to be performed to set the child apart as a member of the Covenant people long before he had a choice in the matter. When freedom and choice are wrested from their Biblical moorings, they become as dangerous a humanistic innovation as does misplaced coercion. The view expressed here is another expression of neutrality. The child should be raised in a religiously neutral environment so that his choice of religion is as freely made as possible when he is old enough to be able to make his own decision. There is no such thing as neutrality.
So, does one’s view of these things affect one’s thinking on church/state matters? Perhaps. I think we see some confusion and acceptance of the notion of neutrality in Mr. Gosselin’s comments on what a Christian political theory should be.
He starts out with the unhelpful language of “Religion and State.” This is the kind of language our opponents have used to good effect against us, and we have to quit being so inaccurate and imprecise. Firstly, Church and State are institutions; religion and politics are realms of theology and philosophy. We need to stop confusing categories. Humanists confuse these categories. We should agree with them if they object to the Church trying to exercise the role of the State, or vice versa, but that is completely different from the question of whether the Christian religion should impact politics. Mr. Gosselin writes: “In the case case of Islam, the Catholic Church in the Middle Ages and several modern ideologies including communism and fascism, the State is seen as an essential instrument of the ideologico-religious system. Religion and State are synchronized, united. From this (religious) drive was born the modern totalitarian state.”
Wrong. He should have said “Church and State” and “Mosque and State” and their equivalents in other belief systems. The problem is not introducing religion to the state. This brings us to the second point: There is no such thing as neutrality. There is no such thing as a state not impacted by religion. It’s always a question of which religion. Christianity should impact the state. If the Catholic variety in the Middle Ages was the wrong approach, then explore why. But if Christianity doesn’t govern the state, then another religion, ideology or belief system will. The problem is not religion influencing the state, it’s the wrong religion influencing the state. It’s the wrong institutions trying to do what God ordained the civil magistrate to oversee.
The third problem with Religion and the State
The third problem with this kind of talk – using the general term “religion” when objecting to its impact on civil government – is that the person writing often lumps a variety of religions together instead of distinguishing Christianity from other religions. Non-Christians constantly do this. Freedom for Christians on Canada’s airwaves has been restricted for years due in part to concerns voiced about Islamic radicalism. Concern was raised about “religion,” so regulations imposed over concerns about Islam were also imposed on Christians. Christians are constantly battling this illegitimate approach to classification that postmodernists use to demonise Christianity as a religion.
Strangely, Mr. Gosselin does that here. In the rest of the book, I find him clear on the reality of antithesis – that it’s Christianity vs. everything else (postmodernism, in particular, as the focus of his book). Why he allows for confusion on that point in these few pages of the book isn’t clear. But he writes: “Note that strong identification of religion with the state often introduces a territorial aspect, that is to say that within a territory belonging to a state or religion, believers will have special status and other groups (defined as unbelievers) will tend to be subject to special taxes, restricted rights and red tape, if not attempts at forced conversion. Middle East historian Eliezer Cherki explains the geographical and cultural views of Islam (2001): …” He then provides another citation from someone “discussing conversion to Islam under Ottoman rule in the nineteenth-century.”
Why is he illustrating the apparent problems with “territorial religion” from Islam? Christianity is a religion. But Christianity is the truth. It’s not simply another comparative religion. Maybe he would lump any Christian tradition that advocates any of the characteristics he identified into the same pot as Islam. In that case, I would take exception to his characterization. Jesus commanded the disciples to go and baptize the nations, not to baptise people from the nations or baptise people out of the nations. They were told to baptise nations. There is a foundational individual personal aspect to Christianity, but there are also very strong covenantal, corporate, comprehensive, worldview characteristics to Christianity. Politicians and other civil magistrates can be Christians. Christianity is a worldview, so the Bible is sufficient for a country’s legal system. The Bible gives us principles for public morality. They’re the same as the principles for private morality. God is not divided. We have the principles for political theory. God is sovereign so human authority must be divided. Man is sinful, so power must be diffused because absolute power will corrupt. There’s much more, but start there.
As public institutions including the state apply Biblical principles (as opposed to non-Christian principles, which is the only alternative since there is no such thing as neutrality), there will be certain characteristics of their activity that will be “territorial” in nature. Enforcing the law is coercive, so if you don’t like a law, and can characterise it as a “religious” law rather than one with universal benefit, then you can perhaps get away with framing it as an expression of religious coercion. Humanists have argued along these lines to get rid of Sunday Shopping laws as well as to keep abortion legal and to decriminalize many sexual activities. Many Christians have bought into this classification of law and accepted those arguments but, as I noted in my review of God and Government, enforcing laws against behaviour is not the same as attempting to legislate against a person’s conscience and religious convictions. All laws are imposing somebody’s morality and religious convictions on those within a particular jurisdiction whether they agree with the law or not. Many modern Christians confuse these categories when reading their own theology back into what took place in the Middle Ages and at other times in history when there were nations which identified as Christian.
Mr. Gosselin also objected to John Calvin’s experiment with a Christian territory when it came to Geneva. “Early Protestants briefly attempted such a State-Religion fusion in Geneva under Calvin, but such experiments were quickly dropped.” Again, though it’s still an inaccurate representation of what was going on in Geneva, Mr. Gosselin should have phrased that as a “State-Church fusion,” not “State-Religion” because no other concept exists in human experience. Never in the whole of human history has there been an experience with a State-Non-Religion fusion. Humanity doesn’t exist in any sphere without religion. The question is always WHICH religion. There is no such thing as a non-religious state. There is no neutrality.
Having said that, there have been a number of other experiments at Christian nationhood. One of the most significant was the Covenanters/Presbyterians who brought England, Scotland and Ireland together under the Solemn League and Covenant, following Scotland’s decision to covenant itself with God via the National Covenant. There was a movement in the United States for many years pushing for a Constitutional amendment to recognize explicitly the Lordship of Christ over the nation. In recent decades different schools of thought such as theonomy have been keeping this vision alive. Nations like Canada didn’t explicitly covenant with God, but they behaved in many respects as though they were a Christian nation. This is brought out in Leaving God Behind, the book we are about to publish by Michael Wagner. We had Lord’s Day legislation for decades, and it was defended on the basis of our Christian character and heritage. Until the Charter of Rights, people argued for explicitly Christian content in Ontario’s public schools because the influence makers understood that we were a Christian nation. Even today leaders in some nations aspire to lead their countries to publicly and corporately acknowledge Christ. South Sudan comes to mind. So does Liberia. Nations are governed by idols and harmful heathen law or they are governed by God in Christ and His gracious law. Paul explicitly told Timothy to pray for the political leaders that they would promote peace in their lands so that the environment was more conducive to the spread of the Gospel. The New Testament draws an explicit link between the spread of the Gospel and the work of civil magistrates. This is not an outdated Old Testament notion. There is no neutrality.
Alright, I said that I only objected to one small part of Flight from the Absolute, but I have spent a great deal of time addressing that point of objection, so you may well be left with the impression that this aspect of the book looms large. That was not my intention, but as I noted, I think that this area of discussion, and the question of neutrality, is a central and crucial issue in our time, and one which Christians have to get right if we’re going to glorify God and be useful Kingdom citizens for Christ. I, therefore, take the opportunities given to me to address the matter, and far better to discuss the topic by way of interaction with other ideas rather than attempting to do so in a strictly academic framework that makes most people fall asleep.
Though I disagree with Mr. Gosselin’s thoughts on what a Christian approach to social order and civil governance looks like, I benefited greatly from his interesting, readable and astute cynical observations on the postmodern West. He calls this book Volume i. I am looking forward to what he has in store for us in Volume II.